IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT/
MANUFACTURER IN GENERIC PRODUCT
CASES: ISSUES AND QUESTIONS*
Honorable William A. Dreier**
To this date, there have been no definitive New Jersey
Supreme Court cases addressing the problems faced by a plaintiff
who is unable to identify the manufacturer of an injury-producing product. Frequently this problem arises when a product is
distributed generically, when it is mixed with the products of several manufacturers before it reaches the public, or when it may
be otherwise impossible to identify which of several manufacturers produced the particular product. The problem has appeared
in New Jersey cases with respect to generic drugs, in which the
effects of the alleged defect are manifested many years later, and
to chemicals under circumstances in which the source may be difficult (if not impossible) to prove. This issue, however, can appear in many contexts.
The most frequently reported national example involves the
drug diethylstilbestrol, known as DES. The DES cases involve a
plaintiff who is generally unable to identify the precise manufacturer of the drug ingested by her mother a generation earlier.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, in Nanmn v.
Charles E. Frosst & Co.,' determined that this issue must be left to
the Supreme Court' and, in any event, none of the then-existing
theories of collective responsibility would be applied in New
Jersey.
Since Namm, most New Jersey controversies raising the issue
have been settled before they could engender a contrary appel* This article in no way is to be considered an official position either of the
author or of the New Jersey courts.
** B.S., Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1958; J.D., Columbia University
1961. Judge, New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division.
1 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (App. Div. 1981).
2 Id. at 35, 427 A.2d at 1129. The appellate division asserted that they were
"bound by the principles of law developed and declared by our Supreme Court.
Extensive policy shifts of this magnitude should not be initiated by an intermediate
appellate court. The appropriate tribunal to accomplish such drastic changes is
either the Supreme Court or the Legislature." Id.
3 Specifically, the plaintiffs in Namm advocated the alternative liability theory
and the enterprise liability or industry-wide liability theories. Id. at 27, 427 A.2d at
1125. See ifra notes 19-43 and accompanying text (discussion of theories).
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late opinion. Two DES cases, however, which have reached the
New Jersey Supreme Court are Salomon v. Eli Lilly and Co.,4 and
Wolfsbruck v. Dow Chemical Co. 5 Salomon, like Namm, was a DES
action in which the defendants similarly claimed that the plaintiff
could not identify the manufacturer of the particular medication,
prescribed generically, that had been ingested by the plaintiff's
mother many years before. 6 The trial court dismissed the action
on its own motion. 7 The supreme court, in remanding the case,
concluded that the complaint should not have been dismissed by
the trial court on its own motion, but declined at that time to pass
upon the potential validity of any causes of action or defenses.'
In Wolfsbruck, the plaintiff sued manufacturers and distributors of the industrial chemical perchloroethylene (Perc), which is
used to clean dry cleaning machines and laundry. 9 The plaintiff
claimed that exposure to the product fatally injured her husband.' ° The decedent's employment required him to service at
least twenty-eight stores using Perc." Nine of these stores received Perc from one distributor and two received the chemical
from another.' 2 The distributor that serviced the nine stores received fifty percent of its Perc from one manufacturer and the
balance from other manufacturers. 13 The other distributor received its entire supply from a different manufacturer.' 4 The appellate division in Wolfsbruck affirmed, with a dissent, the trial
court's entry of judgment in favor of defendants as required by
Namm, following an in limine motion.' 5 In its opinion, the court,
citing Namm, declined to adopt any theory of collective responsibility.1 6 The New Jersey Supreme Court subsequently
remanded
7
the case for an expansion of the record.'
As was noted in the appellate division dissent in Wolfsbruck,
there are four theories upon which some measure of industry4 98 N.J. 58, 484 A.2d 320 (1984).

5 101 N.J. 252, 501 A.2d 924 (1985).
6 See Salomon, 98 N.J. at 59-60, 484 A.2d at 321.
7 Id. at 61, 484 A.2d at 321.
8 See id., 484 A.2d at 322.
9 See Wolfsbruck v. Dow Chemical Co., No. A-970-82T3, slip op. at 2 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. App. Div. Mar. 22, 1984), remanded, 101 N.J. 252, 501 A.2d 924 (1985).
10 Id. at 4.

I1 Id. at 3.
12

13

Id.
Id.

14 Id.
15 See

id. at 7.
16 Id. at 4-6.
17 lVolfsbruck, 101 N.J. at 252, 501 A.2d at 924.
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wide responsibility is based."8 The dissent delineated the four
theories as (1) concert of action, (2) alternative liability, (3) enterprise or industry-wide liability, and (4) "market share" modification of enterprise liability. 1
The concert of action theory is "based upon the substantial
assistance of various producers of a product to each other to accomplish a tortious result. '2 1) This theory has been explained as
allocating responsibility upon parties who "in pursuance of a
common plan or design to commit a tortious act, actively take
part in it, or further it by cooperation or request, or who lend aid
or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt the
wrongdoer's acts done for their benefit ....,,2 The concert of
22
action theory finds acceptance in the Second Restatement of Torts,
as well as in a number of products liability cases.2 3
The alternative liability theory holds that when "one of a
group is responsible . . .the burden shifts to the other defendants to exculpate themselves."2 4 For example, in Anderson v.
Somberg, 25 while undergoing spinal surgery, the tip of a metallic
instrument was broken off and left inside the plaintiff.2 6 Since
the plaintiff was unable to discover the identity of the party who
caused the damage, he named a number of defendants who
might be subject to liability.2 7 The court, finding that a duty to
the patient was breached, held that the burden of proof shifted to
the defendants to show their freedom from liability.28 This theory has been utilized in a number of cases involving products
liability claims, 29 and is supported in the Second Restatement of
18 See Wolfsbruck, slip op. at 7-9 (Dreier, J., dissenting).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 7 (DreierJ., dissenting).
21 W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER
LAW OF TORTS § 46, at 323 (5th ed. 1984).
22

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF THE LAW OF TORTS

AND KEETON ON THE

§ 876 (1979) [hereinafter RE-

STATEMENT SECOND].

23 See, e.g., Abel v. Eli Lily & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 336-39, 343 N.W.2d 164, 176
(1984); Bichler v. Eli Lily & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776
(1982).
24 lolfsbruck, slip op. at 7 (Dreier, J., dissenting).
25 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975).
26 Id. at 294., 338 A.2d at 3.
27 Id. at 295, 338 A.2d at 3. Specifically, the plaintiff named as defendants his
doctor, the hospital, the hospital's medical supply distributor, and the manufacturer of the medical instrument (a rongeur). Id.
28 Id. at 302, 338 A.2d at 6-7.
29 See, e.g.,
Bottazzi v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 664 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1981);
Abel v. Eli Lily & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164 (1984); Anderson v.
Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975); NOPCO v.
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Torts.'
The enterprise or industry-wide liability theory imposes liability upon all members of an industry producing a product
which causes harm; then, the theory gives the defendants the opportunity to exculpate themselves. Though this theory has been
described as a hybrid of the concert of action and alternative liability theories,' the theory specifically allocates
the industrywide (sic) standard .

. .

[as] the cause of the plain-

tiffs' injury, just as defendants'joint plan is the cause of injury
in the traditional concert of action plea. Each defendant's adherence perpetuates this standard, which results in the manufacture of the particular, unidentifiable injury-causing product.
Therefore, each industry member has contributed to plaintiff's injury. 32
Use of the enterprise or industry-wide liability theory is exemplified
in Hall v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. , in which a number of
children suffered injuries as a result of blasting caps that exploded. 34 The defendants in this case were the six companies who
manufactured nearly all of the blasting caps in the United States.3 5
The defendants, through their common trade association,3 6 chose
not to place warnings directly on each blasting cap and neglected to
utilize other safety measures. 37 Though the complaint did not identify a specific manufacturer, it alleged that the industry, by its uniform
practices, created the 'risk of harm.3" The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York, in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, noted the viability of the plaintiff's claims as
a result of the defendants' "joint control of risk." '139 Specifically, the
court held that if the plaintiffs could prove by a preponderance of
the available evidence that the caps causing the accident were the
product of one of the defendants, then the burden of proof regardBlaw-Knox Co., 59 N.J. 274, 272 A.2d 549 (1971). See also Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.
2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (applying alternative liability principles in pure negligence
action).
30
RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 22, § 433 B(3).
31 See Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L.
REV. 963, 974 (1978).
32 Id. at 997.
33 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
34 Id. at 359.
35 Id. at 358.
36 The defendants' common trade association, the Institute of Makers of Explo-

sives (I.M.E.), was also named as a defendant. Id.
37 Id. at 359.
3'8See id.
39 See id. at 375-76.
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ing causation would shift to them.4" Reflecting on Hall's applicability to subsequent cases, the court posited that although its holding
.seemed fair given the facts before it, the reasoning "might be manifestly unreasonable if applied to a decentralized industry composed
4
of thousands of small producers." '
In the "market share" modification of enterprise liability, each
defendant is liable to the plaintiff for a pro rata portion of the damages caused by the product, limited to the percentage share that defendant held of the relevant market. This theory was introduced by
the California Supreme Court in the landmark case of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.4 2 In Sindell, the court ruled that all of the defendants who manufactured DES "will be held liable for the proportion
of the judgment represented by its share of that market unless it
demonstrates that it could not have made the product which caused
plaintiff's injuries.""
Although the "market share" theory has been criticized,4 4 some
courts have implied their willingness to utilize the theory. 45 In Payton v. Abbott Labs,4 6 the plaintiffs were a class alleging injury as a
result of DES intake by their mothers, but, similar to other cases,
were unable to identify a specific manufacturer. 47 Although the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court chose not to follow Sindell beId. at 379.
Id. at 378.
26 Cal.3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980).
43 Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
44 The initial criticism of the Sindell holding emanated from the dissent in that
case which stated that this type of liability "represents a new high water mark in tort
law" and may impose liability exceeding absolute liability. Id. at 614, 607 P.2d at
938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (Richardson, J., dissenting). The California Supreme
Court subsequently explained Sindell in Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 40
Cal.3d 672, 710 P.2d 247, 221 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1985). In .lluphir, the court found
that a 10% DES market share by the defendant was insufficient to trigger the market share alternative liability theory. Id. at 684, 710 P.2d at 255. 221 Cal. Rptr. at
455. In sum, the court held that a "substantial" share of the market must bejoined
in an action before the burden of proof as to causation will shift to the defendants.
See id. For general criticisms of Sindell, see Fischer, Prodticts Liabilit(-Y-n .- ialy's a]
Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1623 (1981); Comment, .arket Shaem Liability
40
41
42

fo1 Defective Products: An Itt-Advised Remedy for the Problem of Idenificatioti,

76

Nw.U.L.REV. 300 (1981).
45 See, e.g., McCormack v. Abbott Laboratories, 617 F, Supp. 1521 (1). Mass.
1985); Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 573 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1983); McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265 (D.S.D. 1983); Hardy v. Johns-Mlanville
Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex 1981), rev d on other giomnds. 681 F.2d 334
(5th Cir. 1982); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540. 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982):
Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 \Wash.2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984) (en bane).
46 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982).
47 See id. at 542-43, 437 N.E.2d at 173.
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cause of its concern with the ability of a non-negligent defendant, or
one who could prove a lack of causation to exculpate itself,4 8 the
court did indicate:
In both their reply brief and in oral argument, the plaintiffs suggest that if particular aspects of their market share theory create difficulties, we should excise, reformulate, and
rewrite to create a theory under which they could recover
without meeting the identification requirement. The posture
of the case and consequence state of the record, the magnitude of the ramifications of our decision with respect to this
certified question, and our view of the judicial process combine to convince us that such a course of action is imprudent
at this time.
That is not to say that on an adequate record this court would not
recognize some relaxation of the traditionalidentification requirement in
appropriate circumstances so as to allow recovery against a negligent
defendant of that portion of a plaintiff's damages which is represented by
that defendant'scontribution of DES to the market in the relevantperiod
of time.49

In summarizing, the Massachusetts court explained:
[W]e are unable to give a definitive answer on this record
whether the manufacturers of DES named as defendants (who
probably supplied some of the DES ingested by the mothers of
the plaintiffs) can or cannot be held liable to the members of
the plaintiffs' class when neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants can identify which manufacturers' DES was ingested by
which mothers and where the named defendants are only
some of the manufacturers of DES ingested by the mothers of
the plaintiffs. We have indicated, however, the view that we might
permit recovery from those defendants shown to be negligent to the extent
of their participationin the DES market, even though the plaintiffs can5
not identify the particularsource of DES which their mothers ingested. 1
The case of McCormack v. Abbott Laboratories5 ' provided the Fed-

eral District Court in Massachusetts with the factual scenario envisioned in the Payton dictum. In McCormack, the court utilized a
market share theory, presuming all of the named defendants held
equal shares of the market; however, the court gave the defendants
5
an opportunity to prove their actual market share .
Federal courts have generally split on whether to adopt any of
Id. at 572-73, 437 N.E.2d at 189.
.19 Id. at 574, 437 N.E.2d at 190 (emphasis added).
50 Id. at 575, 437 N.E.2d at 190 (emphasis added).
51 617 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Mass. 1985).
52 Id. at 1526-27.
48
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the four theories. 53 A number of federal courts have declined to use
these theories because the states in which they sit had not yet
adopted them.5 4 Other federal courts have rejected these theories
"on the basis that the product involved does not lend itself to market share or other [collective responsibility] analysis." 5 5 For example, in In re Related Asbestos Cases,5 6 the District Court for the
Northern District in California, recognizing the practical difficulties
in determining the market share, held that California's "market
share" theory should not be applied in all contexts. 57 Additionally,
the court noted that in asbestos cases:
numerous factors would make it exceedingly difficult to ascertain an accurate division of liability along market share lines.
For example, unlike DES, which is a fungible commodity, asbestos fibers are of several varieties, each used in varying
quantities by defendants in their products, and each differing
in its harmful effects. Second, defining the relevant product
and geographic markets would be an extremely complex task
due to the numerous uses to which asbestos is put, and to the
fact that some of the products to which the plaintiffs were ex-

posed were undoubtedly purchased out of state sometime
prior to the plaintiffs' exposure. A third factor contributing to
the difficulty in calculating market shares is the fact that some
plaintiffs were exposed to asbestos over a period of many
years, during which time some defendants began or discontin53 For federal cases adopting at least one of the theories, see, e.g., Bottazzi v.
Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 664 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1981) (alternative liability theory); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973) (enterprise liability theory); McCormack v. Abbott Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1521 (D.
Mass. 1985) (market share theory); McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265
(D.S.D. 1983) (alternative liability theory); Hardy v. Johns-Mansville Sales Corp.,
509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'don other grounds, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir.
1982) (market share theory); Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 573 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D.
Cal. 1983) (market share theory); Hall v. E. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 345
F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (enterprise liability theory).
For federal cases rejecting all of the theories, see, e.g., In re Related Asbestos
Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Morton v. Abbott Laboratories, 538 F.
Supp. 593 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589 (D.S.C.
1981); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981).
54 See, e.g., Morton v. Abbott Laboratories, 538 F. Supp. 593 (M.D. Fla. 1982);
Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 533 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Mizell
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589 (D.S.C. 1981); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F.
Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981).
55 lVofsbruck, slip op. at I1 (Dreier, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Hannon v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. La. 1983); In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543
F. Supp. 1152 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
5( 543 F. Supp. 1152 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
57 See id. at 1158.
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ued making asbestos products.58
State courts, other than New Jersey, have not been hesitant to
utilize the four theories.5" Courts in only two states, Missouri and
Iowa, have unqualifiedly rejected the theories. In Zaift v. Eli Lilly &
Co.," a DES case, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected all of the
theories

of collective responsibility on a public policy basis, 6 '

stating:
Competing with the interests of appellants are legitimate concerns that liability will discourage desired pharmaceutical research and development while adding little incentive to
production of safe products, for all companies face potential
liability regardless of their efforts ....

And the consequences

of imposing liability without identification extend to other areas of products liability law. 62
In Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co.,63 another DES case, the Iowa
Supreme Court declined to recognize any of the three theories contained in its certified question. 64 Noting the inapplicability of the
alternative liability and enterprise liability theories to DES cases, 6 5
and rejecting the market share theory on policy grounds,6 6 the court
stated:
We believe... that awarding damages to an admitted innocent
party by means of a court-constructed device that places liability on manufacturers who were not proved to have caused the
injury involves social engineering more appropriately within
the legislative domain.... Plaintiffs request that we make a
substantial departure from our fundamental negligence requirement of proving causation, without previous warning or
guidelines. The imposition of liability upon a manufacturer
for harm that it may not have caused is the very legal legerdemain, at least by our long held traditional standards, that we
believe the courts should avoid unless prior warnings remain
58

Id.

59 See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163

Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (market share theorv); Abel v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311,343 N.W.2d 164 (1984) (alternative liability and concert
of action theories); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450
N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982) (concert of action theory); Martin '. Abbott Laboratories, 102
Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984) (modified market share theory).
60 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
(i' See id. at 244-47.

Id. at 247 (citations omitted).
63 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1986).
64 See id. at 70, 76. The theories advanced were the market share liability theory,
the alternative liability theory, and the enterprise liability theory. Id. at 70.
65 Id. at 72, 74.
66( Id. at 75.
62
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unheeded. It is an act more closely identified as a function
67
assigned to the legislature under its power to enact laws.
In Martin v. Abbott Laboratories,6 8 the Supreme Court of Washington chose not to recognize any of the established approaches by
label, and instead adopted a modified market share liability theoryextending even beyond Sindell.6" First, the court required a plaintiff
utilizing its theory to join one or more defendants and prove that
such defendant(s) manufactured or marketed the DES that caused
the injury.7 0 Next, the court held that any defendant may implead
other defendants to reduce its presumptive share of the market and,
further, may show its actual share of the market in order to reduce
potential liability. 7 ' Finally, those defendants remaining in the case
are presumed to have produced the entire market upon which the
final percentages of liability are to be based.7 2
As earlier noted, the appellate division in Wolfsbruck, relying on
its interpretation of Namm, affirmed a trial court decision which refused to apply any theory of collective responsibility.7 1 Is Wolfsbruck,
however, so different from the landmark alternative liability theory
case of Summers v. Tice?"4 In Summers, the plaintiff sustained injuries
when his eye was struck by shotgun pellets emanating from the gun
of one of the two defendants, neither of whom saw him in their field
of fire. 5 The injured plaintiff, however, was unable to prove which
of the defendants fired the pellets which struck him.7 6 The Summers
court held that the two defendants were equally responsible for the
injuries and shifted the burden of proof to the defendants to determine the actual tortfeasor.7 y The Summers principle was subsequently codified in the Second Restatement of Torts, section 433 B(3),
which reads:
Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is
proved that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one
of them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused it,
the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not
67
(38

Id. at 76.
102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984) (en banc).

69 See id. at 605-06, 689 P.2d at 382-83.
70 Id. at 604, 689 P.2d at 382.
71 See id.

72 Id. at 605-07, 689 P.2d at 383.
7:1

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.

74 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
75

Id. at 82, 199 P.2d at 1-2.

76 Id. at 83, 199 P.2d at 2.

77 See id. at 86, 199 P.2d at 4.
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caused the harm.7 8
In Wolfsbruck, the plaintiff's decedent was injured by exposure
to allegedly defective perchloroethylene which was introduced into
the stream of commerce by several manufacturers. 79 The plaintiff
contended that some of the manufacturers' products injured and
killed the plaintiff's decedent.8" Suppose in Summers that there was
a third hunter who could not be joined in the action. Would it have
been unfair then to hold the two defendants responsible for at least
a two-thirds share of the plaintiff's damages? As the comment to
section 433 B(3) of the Second Restatement of Torts explains:

The cases thus far decided in which the rule stated in Subsection (3) has been applied all have been cases in which all of
the actors involved have been joined as defendants. All of
these cases have involved conduct simultaneous in time, or
substantially so, and all of them have involved conduct of substantially the same character, creating substantially the same
risk of harm, on the part of each actor. It is possible that cases
may arise in which some modification of the rule stated may be necessary
because of complications arisingfrom the fact that one of the actors involved is not or cannot be joined as a defendant, or because of the

effect of lapse of time, or because of substantial differences in
the character of the conduct of the actors or the risks which
they have created. Since such cases have not arisen, and the
situations which might arise are difficult to forecast, no attempt is made to deal with such problems in this Section. The
rule stated in Subsection (3) is not intended to preclude possible modification if such situations callfor it.8 '

Suppose there was a fourth hunter in the Summers case who could
prove that he used different sized shot or that he fired in a different
direction and thus could not be responsible for the injuries. It
would seem only logical that he be excluded and the remaining
hunters held liable for their share as before. This analogy is not
really far-fetched, and provides a framework for a liability analysis.
As exemplified by Anderson v. Somberg, 82 New Jersey courts have
been receptive to a shifting of the burden of proof in appropriate
circumstances. This notion was supported by the Wolfsbruck dissent,
which noted:
Our Supreme Court in Anderson v. Somberg....

clearly stated

78 RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 22, § 433 B(3).
79 See Io(lfsbruck, slip op. at 3.
80 Id. at 4.
81 RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 22, § 433 comment h (emphasis added).
82 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975). See supra notes 25-28
and accompanying text (discussion of Anderson).
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that a defendant in an alternative liability case has the opportunity to exculpate itself, and is responsible only if it fails so to
exculpate itself...
This exculpation is a factor that a trial court should consider in a market share (enterprise liability) case in determining the percentages of the market for which a defendant would
be responsible. The trial court should define the market depending upon the circumstances of the case. For example, in
a drug case the market may be the suppliers to plaintiff's pharmacy or the immediate geographical area if the pharmacy has
incomplete records. If a drug company can show by its
records that it did not supply the pharmacy or area, as the case
may be, it would be exculpated.8 3
Utilization of the above approach in a drug, chemical, or similar case
permits the Summers rationale, combined with fairness, to allow a defendant to show that its product could not have caused the injury.
There is no basis in most cases for a true enterprise liability, or a
concert of action, to accomplish a tortious result. The ability to exculpate oneself should be an integral part of any general theory of
liability. As was stated in the Wolfsbruck dissent:
I, however, have not suggested adoption of a pure enterprise
liability approach. In the interest of fairness to both an injured plaintiff and the affected industry, a more balanced rule
is needed that limits liability to the proportion of a culpable
defendant's participation in the product's distribution. 4
Applying Anderson and the Summers analysis as quoted above appears to require no radical departure in New Jersey for the adoption
of a modified market share theory of liability, notwithstanding the
Namm court's determination that "[e]xtensive policy shifts of this
magnitude should not be initiated by an intermediate appellate
court."'8

5

A resolution of this issue, however, must await a later day.

An issue left open in all of the decided New Jersey cases is
whether the liability to be assessed under any theory of collective
responsibility should be joint or several. The New Jersey Supreme
Court has noted that the strict liability analysis, once knowledge of
the defect is imputed, is "almost identical to [a] negligence analysis
in its focus on the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct." 6
When there is no true "concert of action" in, for example, circum8 3' ll'ofsbruck, slip op. at 13 (Dreier, J., dissenting).

Id. at 17 (Dreier, J., dissenting).
,Vamm, 178 N.J. Super. at 35, 427 A.2d at 1129. Use of this modified market
share theory was first advanced in Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly and Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551,
420 A.2d 1305 (Law Div. 1980), but was rejected by the trial court.
8" Feldman v. Leclerle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 451, 479 A.2d 374, 385 (1984).
84
85
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stances wherein there is a conspiracy to distribute an unsafe product
or the like, defendants are joined as a group, not because they are
joint tortfeasors, but because of the problem of identification of the
particular distributor. Yet, each might well be held accountable
only for its own actions. In this limited respect, where there is no
true "concert of action," the case might differ from the "joint and
several" analysis of Summers. In Summers, it was unclear whether the
court in finding alternative liability engendering joint and several
responsibility focused upon the agreed-upon dangerous activity in
its determination of the joint aspect of liability.
There has not yet been a New Jersey case raising the issue of
the appropriateness of several, as opposed to joint and several, liability in an alternative liability market share or modified market
share setting. In the appropriate case, a negligence-related analysis
of the reasons for each type of responsibility must be examined
before either approach can be applied.
A related matter is the duty of either the plaintiff or one or
more of the defendants to assemble all possible manufacturers and
distributors. The relevant "market" for at least limited market
share liability is the area of possible distribution to the New Jersey
plaintiff, and thus, the long-arm jurisdiction of New Jersey 7 could
be exercised over all such defendants."8 If less than all of the possible defendants are joined, a court must determine whether there is a
reason to shift to the initial defendants the responsibility for impleading all remaining possible defendants. A plaintiff could assume its traditional burden if responsibility is several; either side
could be given the duty if the responsibility is joint and several.
This issue also will require thought and resolution as subsequent
cases unfold.
As was noted in the Wolfsbruck dissent, the trial judge was correct in determining Namm to be the controlling law and dismissing
the complaint. New Jersey courts following the Namm decision have
not utilized any of the four existing theories of industry-wide allocation of responsibility in generic products liability cases. Of course,
unless and until the New Jersey Supreme Court or some other part
See N.J. CT. R. 4:4-4(a),(c),(e) (defining long-arm jurisdiction in New Jersey).
See Charles Gendler & Co., Inc. v. Telecom Equip. Corp., 102 N.J. 460, 480,
508 A.2d 1127, 1137 (1986) (New Jersey may retain jurisdiction "if the manufacturer knew or reasonably should have known of the distribution system through
"). See also Note, .Vew JerseY .-idopts Stream-ofwhich its products were being sold ..
Commece Theory for Establishing PersonalJnrisdiction Over a Foreign.iMamfacturer,17 SEREV. 700 (1987).
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of the appellate division in a published opinion rejects the Namm
rationale, all trial judges will continue to be bound to follow Namm.

